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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Luke Allan Walsh appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and
unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed, following his plea of guilty to
conspiracy to violation the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, Mr. Walsh
contends the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 8, 2011, Jordan Dunn, who was on felony probation, was detained by
his probation officer and Officer Alex Boyer for failing to comply with his probation.
(R., p.3.) Upon discovering Mr. Dunn's cellular telephone, Officer Boyer observed a text

that Mr. Dunn had received from a person named "LAW" on the phone. (R., pp.3-4.)
The text read, "What you got[?]." Officer Boyer then began texting back and forth with
"LAW" and negotiated the purchase of .5 grams of cocaine for $40.

(R., p.4.) The

exchange was to occur in the parking lot of the Mormon Church in Wendell, Idaho.
(R., pp.3-4.)

Prior to the exchange, officers executed of traffic stop of a white truck,

identified as belonging to "LAW" through the text messages.

(R., pp.4-5.)

The

passenger, later identified as Luke Walsh, was removed from the vehicle and placed
under arrest. (R., pp.4-5.) The driver of the vehicle was identified, by his Idaho driver's
license, as Brandon Thompson. (R., p.4.)
Mr. Walsh was charged by Information with conspiracy to purchase cocaine.
(R., pp.11-13.) The charging document alleged:

On or about the 8th day of March, 2011, within Gooding County,
State of Idaho, and elsewhere, the Defendant, LUKE WALSH, did willfully
and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with another
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person to possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Cocaine, a Schedule II
controlled substance, in violation of I. C. Sections 37-2732, 18-1701.
OVERT ACTS
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof,
the following overt acts[,] among others, were committed within Gooding
County and elsewhere.
On or about March 8, 2011, Luke Walsh sent text messages
to the cellular telephone of Jordan Dunn making
arraignments to purchase .5 grams of Cocaine from Jordan
Dunn for $40.00.
Luke Walsh traveled to a prearranged locations near the
LOS Church in the city of Wendell, County of Gooding with
the agreed upon $40.00 for payment for the Cocaine.
(R., pp.11-12.) Mr. Walsh then entered into a plea agreement with the State, wherein,

in exchange for the State agreeing to recommend drug court, Mr. Walsh would plead
guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine, as charged. (Tr., p.13, Ls.10-15.) Mr. Walsh
also agreed to testify truthfully at the trial of Jordan Dunn. (Tr., p.13, Ls.22-23.) During
the plea colloquy, the following exchange occurred between IVlr. Walsh and the district
court:
Court:

Do you believe any of your constitutional rights have been
violated in this matter?

Mr. Walsh:

No.

Court:

Do you believe you have any defenses to the charge to
which you intend to enter the plea to?

Mr. Walsh:

No.

Court:

And why is it you say you're guilty?

Mr. Walsh:

I tried to
messages.

Court:

Okay.

purchase

cocaine through
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my phone text

Mr. Walsh:

It's all there.

Court:

And did you also make arrangements with Mr. Dunn to meet
him at the LOS Church to complete the transaction?

Mr. Walsh:

That's - - I thought it was him.

Defense:

Your Honor, this was done by a police officer's texting on the
other end so technically it wasn't Mr. Dunn.

(Tr., p.18, L.12 - p.20, L.3.) The district court accepted Mr. Walsh's plea of guilty to
conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substance Act. (Tr., p.20, Ls.12-16.) A
few weeks later, Mr. Walsh failed to appear for a drug court appearance and as a result,
was not accepted into the program. (R., p.16.)
Prior to sentencing and prior to receipt of the Presentence Investigation Report,
Mr. Walsh filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.20-21; Tr., p.38, Ls.1-5.) In
his affidavit, Mr. Walsh indicated that his defense attorney wanted to take the case to
trial based upon a belief that a crime had not taken place, "but given my belief that
Jordan Dunn was involved, I chose to enter my guilty plea." {R., pp.22-23.) Defense
counsel for Mr. Walsh also filed the Affidavit of David Jordan Dunn, who averred that he
was not present at any point in time when Gooding County law enforcement officers
were using his cellular phone to text Mr. Walsh. (R., pp.25-26.)
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty plea, defense counsel clarified for
the district court that Mr. Walsh entered his plea of guilty because although he was
aware that Mr. Dunn was not doing the texting, he believed Mr. Dunn to be present
during the transaction. (Tr., p.25, L.16 - p.24, L.16.) Defense counsel then argued that
there could be no conspiracy because a person cannot enter into an agreement with an
officer to supply drugs because the officer never intended to supply the cocaine. (See
Tr., p.23, L.22 - p.26, L.19.) As a result, "there can be no crime to conspire with a
3

police officer." (Tr., p.42, Ls.2-5.)

In response, the State agreed with the defense,

essentially conceding that "it is not possible to have the crime of conspiracy when it is
only between the defendant and a law enforcement agent," citing the district court to
United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1984). (Tr., p.32, Ls.6-16.)

The State, however, argued that there was not a "constitutional defect" because "there
was information present that a jury could have found that there was a conspiracy, not
with their [sic] law enforcement officer, but with Mr. Thompson," which is a question for
the jury.

(Tr., p.28, L.10 - p.33, L.11.)

Defense counsel responded, "What was

charged was the - - wasn't Mr. Thompson. Mr. Thompson was totally uncharged, was
not a coconspirator. My client's belief is, I think was set out in the affidavit, was that it
was Mr. Dunn that they were inferring to was the process of the texting aspect of - - that
the conspiracy is referring to." (Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L.3.) The district court responded
that the charging document only references that Mr. Walsh conspired with "another
person," and "that other person is not identified." (Tr., p.31, Ls.4-8.) To which defense
counsel argued, "that's part of the defect of the whole thing .... " (Tr., p.31, Ls.9-12.)
In addition to its argument that Mr. Thompson was the coconspirator, the State
argued that Mr. Walsh waived his defense "because he wanted to opportunity of drug
court," and it was only after he was removed from the program that he wanted to
withdraw his guilty plea. (Tr., p.38, L.1 - p.40, L.8.) The State, however, conceded that
it would not be prejudiced if Mr. Walsh were allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
(Tr., p.36, Ls.12-19.) The district court denied Mr. Walsh's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, finding that Mr. Walsh "knew that he was texting with Alex Boyer" and that
Mr. Walsh made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his defenses in entering
a plea of guilty. (Tr., p.47, L.6 - p.50, L.9.)
4

The district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with one year fixed,
upon Mr. Walsh. (R., pp.33-38.) Mr. Walsh filed a Notice of Appeal, timely from the
district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.40-42.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Walsh's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea as he presented a "just reason" and the State conceded that it would not
have been prejudiced if Mr. Walsh had been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Walsh's Motion To Withdraw
His Guilty Plea As He Presented A "Just Reason" And The State Conceded That It
Would Not Have Been Prejudiced If Mr. Walsh Had Been Allowed To Withdraw His
Guilty Plea

A.

Introduction
IVlr. Walsh filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing.

The

district court denied Mr. Walsh's motion and imposed a unified sentence of four years,
with one year fixed, following based upon his plea of guilty to conspiracy to violation the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act.

Mr. Walsh asserts that the district court erred in

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a party cannot conspire with a law
enforcement officer to commit a crime. Moreover, to the extent the State was alleging
that Mr. Walsh was conspiring with Mr. Thompson, because Mr. Walsh was not on
notice as to the nature of the charge against him, he guilty plea could not have been
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As such, Mr. Walsh raised a "just reason" and the
State conceded that it would not have been prejudiced if he had been allowed to
withdraw his guilty plea.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Walsh's Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea As He Presented A "Just Reason" And The State
Conceded That It Would Not Have Been Prejudiced If Mr. Walsh Had Been
Allowed To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
Mr. Walsh asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea which was filed before sentencing.

The decision to grant or deny a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea falls within the discretion of the district court. State v.
McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 361 (Ct. App. 1997).

Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as
7

distinguished from arbitrary action. When a district court's discretionary
decision in a criminal case is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower
court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3)
whether the court reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 71, (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,

600 (1989).
Mr. Walsh contends that the district court erred in denying his motion, prior to
sentencing, to withdraw his guilty plea.

Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that "[a]

motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made only before [the] sentence is imposed or
imposition of [the] sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea." Id. The timing of the motion to withdraw a guilty plea affects
the exercise of the trial court's discretion. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801 (1988).
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed after sentencing can only be granted to correct a
"manifest injustice." Id. "This strict standard is justified to insure that an accused is not
encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of the potential punishment and withdraw
the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe.

Ward, 135 Idaho at 72 (citing

McFarland, 130 Idaho at 361).

A less rigorous standard is applied to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed prior
to sentencing. Ballard, 114 Idaho at 801. However, the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior
to sentencing is not an automatic right. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485 (1993). In
Ward, the Idaho Court of Appeals articulated the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea

prior to sentencing, stating:
A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing must
show a 'just reason' for withdrawing the guilty plea. The 'just reason'
8

standard does not require that a defendant establish a constitutional
defect in his or her guilty plea. Once the defendant has met this burden,
the state may avoid a withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the
existence of prejudice to the state. The defendant's failure to present and
support a plausible reason will dictate against granting the withdrawal,
even absent prejudice to the prosecution . . . the district court is
encouraged to liberally exercise its discretion in granting a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea.
Ward, 135 Idaho at 72 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Mr. Walsh contends that

he provided the district court with a just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea and
the prosecution would have not been prejudiced had he been allowed to withdraw his
plea.
1.

The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Accept Mr. Walsh's Guilty
Plea Because The Factual Predicate For The Charged Offense Did Not
Amount To A Crime

"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at any
time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.

Whether an information

conforms to the requirements of law is also a question subject to free review." State v.
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004) (citations omitted). The Indictment or Information

filed by the prosecution is the jurisdictional instrument upon which a defendant stands
trial. Id. (citing State v. Izzard, 136 Idaho 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2001)). Article I, section 8
of the Idaho Constitution states that, "[n]o person shall be held to answer for any felony
or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or
on information of the public prosecutor [.]" Id. Idaho courts obtain personal jurisdiction
over a criminal defendant when the defendant initially appears in court.

Id. (citing

State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2004)). Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal

case is conferred by the filing of an "information, indictment, or complaint alleging an
offense was committed within the State of Idaho."
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Id.

Since the Indictment or

Information provides subject matter jurisdiction to the court, the court's jurisdictional
power depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge.
Id.

"[T]ardily raised objections based on defects in an indictment or information are

waived unless they allege either (1) a failure to show jurisdiction, or (2) a failure to
charge an offense." Jones, 140 Idaho at 758.
Mr. Walsh asserts that the Information fails to charge an offense for which he can
be convicted.

It is not a crime to conspire with a law enforcement officer for the

purchase of narcotics. See United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.
1984). In Bright, the defendant, Bright, was challenging his convictions for conspiracy
to import heroin and conspiring to possess heroin with the intent to distribute, arguing
that because she only "conspired" with a government agent, she could not be found
guilty of conspiracy. Id. at 1197. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the lower court
erred in failing to instruct the jury that if it determined that she only "conspired' with a
government agent, should could not be found guilty of conspiracy. Id. at 1198-1201.
The Bright Court observed that:
Since the act of agreeing is a group act unless at least two commit it, no
one does. When one of two persons merely pretends to agree, the other
party, whatever he may believe, is in fact not conspiring with anyone.
Although he may possess the requisite criminal intent, there has been no
criminal act.
Id. at 1199 (quoting Developments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Har.L.Rev.

920, 926 (1954)). As such, "the formal requirements of the crime of conspiracy have
not been met unless an individual conspires with at least one bona fide co-conspirator."
Id; see also Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139 (5 th Cir. 1965) ("as it takes two to

conspire, there can be no indictable conspiracy with a government informer who
secretly intends to frustrate the conspiracy.").)
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In the instant case, charging document alleged:
On or about the 8th day of March, 2011, within Gooding County,
State of Idaho, and elsewhere, the Defendant, LUKE WALSH, did willfully
and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with another
person to possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Cocaine, a Schedule II
controlled substance, in violation of I.C. Sections 37-2732, 18-1701.
OVERT ACTS
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof,
the following overt acts[,] among others, were committed within Gooding
County and elsewhere.
On or about March 8, 2011, Luke Walsh sent text messages
to the cellular telephone of Jordan Dunn making
arraignments to purchase .5 grams of Cocaine from Jordan
Dunn for $40.00.
Luke Walsh traveled to a prearranged locations near the
LOS Church in the city of Wendell, County of Gooding with
the agreed upon $40.00 for payment for the Cocaine.
(R, pp.11-12.) Based upon a reading of the plain language of the charging document,

Mr. Walsh believed he was with conspiring to obtain cocaine with Officer Boyer, based
on the belief that he was texting with Mr. Dunn's phone, which was possessed by
Officer Boyer.

In fact, at the change of plea hearing the change of plea hearing

confirms that all parties believed Mr. Walsh was conspiring with Officer Boyer:
Court:

And why is it you say you're guilty?

Mr. Walsh:

I tried to
messages.

Court:

Okay.

Mr. Walsh:

It's all there.

Court:

And did you also make arrangements with Mr. Dunn to meet
him at the LOS Church to complete the transaction?

Mr. Walsh:

That's - - I thought it was him.

purchase cocaine through
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my phone text

Your Honor, this was done by a police officer's texting on the
other end so technically it wasn't Mr. Dunn.

Defense:

(Tr., p.19, L.15 - p.20, L.3.)
If, in fact, the State had a different understand of the factual predicate for the
charged offense, it could have corrected any misunderstanding Mr. Walsh might have
had at that point, but chose to stay silent. Moreover, Mr. Thompson's is not referenced
anywhere in the charging document.

(R., pp.11-12.)

Additionally, the district court's

finding that Mr. Walsh knew he was texting with the officer and therefore "waived" that
"defense" is irrelevant and legally incorrect.

That Mr. Walsh was texting with a law

enforcement officer is not a defense, rather, it is not a crime at all. See United States v.
Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196 (9 th Cir. 1984); Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139

(5 th Cir. 1965).

Because a conspiracy cannot be committed with a law enforcement

officer as the co-conspirator, it is not a criminal offense and the district court was without
jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea. Jurisdictional claims cannot be waived and can be
raised at any time. Jones, 140 Idaho at 758.

2.

If This Court Determines That Mr. Thompson Could Have Been Or Was
The Alleged Conspirator, Because Mr. Walsh Did Not Have Notice Of The
Factual Predicate For The Charged Offense, His Guilty Plea Could Not
Have Been Knowing, Intelligent And Voluntary

To the extent to which Mr. Walsh was charged with conspiring to purchase
cocaine with Mr. Thompson, his plea of guilty was not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered.

The United States Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea,

entered without the defendant understanding all of the elements of the crime to which
he is pleading guilty, is constitutionally invalid. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,
618-619 (1998). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized this same basic principle
and has held that, "Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three
12

areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood
the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly

and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain
from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences
of pleading guilty." State v. Coyier, 98 Idaho 32, 34 (1976) (emphasis added). Thus, it
is clear that in order to enter a valid guilty plea, the defendant must understand the
nature of the charge against him, including the elements of the crime charged.
It is abundantly clear from the record that at the time of the change of plea
hearing, it was Mr. Walsh's belief that he was pleading guilty to conspiracy to violate the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act for conspiring with Officer Boyer to obtain cocaine
by texting Mr. Dunn's cell phone.

(See Tr., p.19, L.15 - p.20, L.3.)

Mr. Walsh's

understanding is bolstered based upon a plain reading of the charging document that
which does not even mention Mr. Thompson's name, much less any agreement to
commit a crime with Mr. Thompson. (See R., pp.11-12.) Nor was there any attempt by
the prosecutor to clarify any factual confusion that might have occurred by Mr. Walsh.
(See Tr-, p.4, L 12 - p.20, L 16.)

It was not until the hearing on Mr. Walsh's motion to withdraw his guilty plea that
the prosecutor, recognizing that a defendant cannot conspire with a law enforcement
agent, alleged that Mr. Walsh had conspired with Mr. Thompson. (See Tr., p.27, L.12p.30, L.12, p.32, L.6 - p.40, L.19.) Defense counsel argued that Mr. Thompson was
"not the named conspirator" and that neither he nor Mr. Walsh believed that the State
had alleged that Mr. Walsh was conspiring with Mr. Thompson. (Tr., p.27, L.8-10, p.31,
Ls.4-12, p.40, L.21 - p.42, L.12.) Thus, it is clear from the record that not only did
Mr. Walsh believe he was pleading guilty to conspiring with Officer Boyer: that was the
13

guilty plea to which the district court accepted.

(See Tr., p.19, L.15 - p.20, L.3.)

A

guilty plea based upon any other factual predicate was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. As a result, Mr. Walsh's plea of guilty was invalid.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Mr. Walsh has raised a just reason for
withdrawing his guilty plea and the State has conceded that it would not be prejudiced.
As such, the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Walsh respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 29 th day of February, 2012.

ERIC . FREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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